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REVIEW
"MY GOD!" IS THIS HOW A FEMINIST ANALYZES EXCITED
UTTERANCES?
RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT
I. INTRODUCTION
In "MY GOD!'" A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, Professor Aviva Orenstein contends
that "evidence law must be modified to address the disparity
between RTS [rape trauma syndrome] and the current structure of
the excited utterance [hearsay] exception."' She would expand the
exception to include a "[s]exual violence survivor's statement," by
which she means, "[a] statement concerning a sexual assault, made
by the survivor concerning the event or its effect on the survivor."2
While it may be that more hearsay from rape claimants should
be admitted into trials, Orenstein's proposal is based upon miscon-
ceptions of evidence law and upon incomplete and misleading
empirical data. Her proposal would do little to correct the problems
she identifies and, at the same time, it could lead to profound
changes in evidence doctrine, which she does not recognize. While
her analysis is supposedly driven by feminist principles and
methods, she uses them haphazardly. The unintended conse-
quences, if these principles were taken seriously, could be particu-
larly dangerous for feminism.
II. HEARSAY, ADMISSIBILITY, AND CREDIBILITY
Orenstein states that those who are raped often delay in
reporting the violence. Because of that delay, such statements are
not admissible as excited utterances, a hearsay exception which
permits otherwise inadmissible hearsay to be admitted if it was
made under the stress of a startling event.3 The justification for
1. Aviva Orenstein, "MY GOD!": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception
to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REv. 159, 211 (1996). Even in advance of its publication, this
article received praise. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narra-
tives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 393 n.23 (1996) (Orenstein's
article is "a superb first effort at crafting a feminist approach to evidence issues .....
2. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 213.
3. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (permiting the admission of hearsay "relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition").
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this exception, Orenstein notes, is that statements precipitated by
external startling events are made without reflection. Since reflec-
tive capacity is necessary for fabrication, excited utterances do not
suffer from the danger of insincerity.4 All of that is accepted doc-
trine, but then Orenstein concludes that because excited utterances
are thought to be sincere and because the rape victim's delayed re-
port does not qualify for the exception, a rape victim's credibility is
thereby denigrated.
In requiring an excited and near-immediate response from the
victim, evidence law implicitly dismisses those who do not fit
the fixed pattern of credibility. The structure of the rules
insinuates that a reaction to a traumatic event that deviates
from this prototype marks the declarant as unnatural, sneaky,
vindictive, or otherwise unreliable.'
Orenstein comes to this conclusion, which leads to her proposal to
admit rape claimants' hearsay, because she has mistaken concep-
tions regarding the hearsay framework and does not understand
how credibility is determined in trials.
Professor Orenstein states that "the primary argument against
hearsay evidence rests upon the assumption that it is dangerously
unreliable."6 Hearsay may suffer from sincerity, narration, percep-
tion, or memory problems, but, she says, "[a]lthough these 'hearsay
dangers' are also present in live testimony, they are diminished by
the availability of cross-examination."7 Since hearsay, however, is
presented without contemporaneous cross-examination, the hearsay
dangers are not diminished, and hearsay is unreliable.
Orenstein's analysis is wrong. Hearsay is not inadmissible
because it is unreliable, and cross-examination does not make
testimony trustworthy. What I say to the store clerk, colleagues,
friends, my spouse, my daughter, my minister, or the registrar is
not all dangerously unreliable nor is what I am told by others. Such
statements could be hearsay if offered in court, but they are not
alarmingly untrustworthy. If that were true, society, commerce,
religious and social organizations, and families could never
function. On the other hand, not everything said in regular
intercourse is correct either. Some of what is said outside the
courtroom is true, and some is not. When a statement's trustwor-
4. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 173.
5. Id. at 203.
6. Id. at 192-93.
7. Id. at 167.
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thiness is important to us, we have to judge its validity; we have to
make judgments, consciously or not, about sincerity and memory
and so forth. We develop methods for this in our everyday lives.
These customary credibility determinants, however, may not be
available in the artificial, formal courtroom world. Instead, in
court, we rely on cross-examination to provide information so that
the statements' accuracy can be judged. When assertions are made
in court, we believe, or hope, that because of cross-examination, the
jury can judge the worth of what it hears. We expect an adversary
to bring out information that would indicate why a statement
should not be taken at face value. In contrast, when assertions are
made out of court, not subject to contemporaneous cross-examina-
tion, we do not have confidence that the jury will receive the
information to assess the statement.8
Neither cross-examination nor an oath makes trial testimony
trustworthy. Everything said at a trial, even though subject to
cross-examination, could not be reliable or there would be no factual
dispute to resolve. We expect witnesses to differ at trial, but we
hope that the trial presents information with which to analyze
contradictions, inconsistencies, and deficiencies. "Cross-examina-
tion's central role is not to make evidence reliable. Instead, the
adversary is given the opportunity to test and challenge the
evidence in front of the jury so that jury will have all the informa-
tion necessary to best assess what weight the evidence should be
given."9 The concern regarding hearsay is not that it is unreliable,
but that it cannot be properly evaluated.
8. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual
Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury
Testimony, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 431, 434 (1986).
When the assertion is made in court, the trier makes these assessments with
information in addition to the words of the declarant. An oath is given to the
witness, and the trier of fact observes his demeanor. Cross-examination,
however, is the most potent source of information about the assertion's worth.
The declarant's adversary has a motive to explore ambiguities in the statement,
to expose insincerity, reveal a flawed memory, or uncover a faulty perception.
The rule against hearsay is inextricably linked with the belief that cross-
examination can demonstrate the debilities of an assertion. When an assertion
is hearsay, it is not subject to contemporaneous cross-examination in front of
the trier of fact. Hearsay is barred because the trier is unable to properly
evaluate the hearsay assertions.
See also FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's introductory note ("The belief, or
perhaps hope, that cross-examination, is effective in exposing imperfections of perception,
memory, and narration is fundamental.") (citing Edmund M. Morgan, Foreward to AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 37 (1942)).
9. Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment,
35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 587-88 (1988).
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Although we have a rule declaring hearsay inadmissible, 10 not
all hearsay, of course, is inadmissible. Hearsay exceptions abound.
Sometimes the conditions under which an assertion is uttered
eliminate or lessen the possibilities of the hearsay dangers. When
the hearsay concerns are reduced, the chances that a particular
assertion is reliable are greater than for hearsay generally.
Accepting such statements on their face is less likely to lead to a
misevaluation than for hearsay generally. Cross-examination
concerning such statements is less likely to reveal information to
the jury useful for judging validity than it is for hearsay generally
because something, supposedly, is already known about one or more
of the hearsay dangers. Consequently, good reasons exist to admit
that hearsay even though hearsay generally is not admitted.1
Statements qualifying as excited utterances are at least
theoretically thought to be more reliable than hearsay generally.
The same, of course, is true for other admissible hearsay, but what
is thought reliable is the assertion, not the declarant. We do not
exclude hearsay falling within an exception because the declarant
is untrustworthy nor do we admit inadmissible hearsay because its
declarant is reliable. If the exception's rationale is correct, the
excited utterance from the known liar is still unlikely to be a lie
because the speaker spoke while his reflection was stilled, and
therefore he was unlikely to be lying. Although an exception may
deem a class of statements more reliable than hearsay generally
and create an exception for that class, the exception says nothing
about the declarant's general credibility.
An exception does not indicate that statements outside its
boundaries or their makers are untrustworthy. If either the
hearsay rule, or its exceptions, labeled inadmissible hearsay
producers unreliable, the rules would be labeling everyone unreli-
able. Witnesses routinely make out-of-court statements about
their testimony's subject matter that do not qualify as excited
utterances because they are not made under the stress of a startling
event. Such assertions have probably been made to spouses,
friends, roommates, children, parents, and lawyers. If somehow
evidence law brands these declarants untrustworthy, then everyone
is unreliable.
It is only because Orenstein misunderstands these basic
hearsay dynamics that she concludes that evidence law brands
10. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
11. No one rationale can explain all the hearsay exceptions. See Jonakait, supra note
8, at 470 (discussing rationale for hearsay exceptions).
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those who utter hearsay that is not within the excited utterance
exception untrustworthy or liars. "The excited utterance exception
... implicitly deems such statements and, arguably, those who
uttered them, more reliable. As a logical matter, the exception also
denigrates statements outside its purview, deeming such state-
ments, and the speakers who made them, insufficiently trustwor-
thy."12 Orenstein's analysis also rests on mistaken assumptions
when she suggests that the excited utterance exception assumes
that those who do not react to stress in a prescribed fashion are
liars. Thus, she asks about the excited utterance exception: "Why
does the law assume that everyone manifests stress in the same
way? Who is likely to report immediately? Why do some people
delay? Why is such delay assumed to be evidence of lying?"'3
The rationale for the excited utterance exception is not a
description or prescription for how trustworthy people do or ought
to react to stress. While the rationale is that unreflecting asser-
tions made in response to startling events are likely to be sincere,
that rationale makes no assumptions about how people generally
react to such events or even how often people react to a startling
event by blurting out a statement. The rationale is only that if
people do so react, the resulting utterance is likely to have a
lessened sincerity danger and, therefore, can be admitted. The
legitimate question for the exception is not how often people
respond to stress by making unreflecting assertions, but when they
do, is it trustworthy? 4 If such declarations are trustworthy, it is of
no consequence that only one in a thousand times does stress
produce such a reaction.
This is no different, for example, from business records. 5 That
exception makes no assumption about how records are made and
kept. If, however, they are made and kept in a certain way, they
fall within the hearsay exception. That only a fraction of all records
qualify as business records hardly means that the business record
exception is wrong or that it needs expansion. Furthermore, the
business records doctrine neither implies nor states that records not
12. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 198.
13. Id.
14. Cf. id. at 203.
[W]e must question why a reaction to stress that is at odds with women's
documented experience is nevertheless venerated by evidence law. Part of the
answer lies in the fact that although the excited utterance does not describe the
experience of women who have suffered rape or other sexual violence, it does
comport with society's expectations of survivors of sexual violence.
Id. (emphasis in original).
15. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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falling with the exception are lies. Similarly, the doctrine neither
implies nor states that the makers of non-qualifying records are
untrustworthy. For example, evidence law does not say that
because my notation that a retailer delivered me a damaged
television is inadmissible that I should not be believed when I
assert it.
It may be, as Orenstein maintains, that raped women who are
calm after the attack are disbelieved.16 Evidence law, however,
does not cause this disbelief. 7 Evidence law admits or excludes
evidence; it does not believe or disbelieve witnesses. Jurors gauge
credibility.8 Of course, there is a connection between a juror's
belief and what the evidence admits. What a juror does not hear,
she cannot believe.' 9 If a victim could not testify about the rape
because she delayed in reporting, evidence law would, in effect, be
labeling her not credible. That, however, does not happen. The
victim can testify about the rape, just as I can testify about the
damaged television I received, even if my notation about it is
inadmissible.
Even so, Orenstein claims that victims are denigrated because
delayed reports of rapes are not admissible as excited utterances.
If so, victims should seem more credible when jurors learn about
delayed reports. Orenstein, however, contends that both judges and
juries are less likely to believe the victim when they learn that she
delayed in reporting the rape. Orenstein asks, "Why is such delay
assumed to be evidence of lying?"20
16. See Orenstein, supra note 1, at 203-04 (stating that rape victims who are calm after
the assault are "disbelieved because they do not fit the expectation that a sincere woman
genuinely wronged would cry out immediately").
17. Cf. Katherine A. Baker, Once a Rapist: Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape
Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 565 (1997).
[E]mpirical analysis of the social norms surrounding rape suggests that rules
of evidence may be ill-equipped to overcome a normative system that resists
punishing rape. Contrary to popular belief, much of the difficulty with securing
rape convictions stems not from an evidentiary problem of credibility, but from
a normative problem of dessert.
Id.
18. Cf Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms,
19 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 127, 127 (1996) ("Cutting across the specific treatments of women's
problematic encounters with the judicial system are two main themes: admissibility and
credibility.").
19. Cf Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and
Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36,
61 (1995) (contending that if cultural information can affect notions of blameworthiness, then
access to cultural information and fundamental issues of blameworthiness "are clearly
connected, because finders of fact and sentencers must have the information in order to
adjudicate blameworthiness fairly in plea negotiations and at trials").
20. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 198.
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If jurors find victims less credible when reports are delayed, the
jurors must be learning about the reports, and they do. The defense
introduces such evidence with hopes that the delayed reports will
damage the credibility of the alleged rape victim.2 Orenstein
argues that the excited utterance exception should be expanded to
admit delayed reports so that a victim's credibility would not be
unfairly denigrated, but under present law, the jurors already learn
about these reports.22 Her proposal would accomplish almost
nothing. Changing a hearsay exception may determine whether
jurors hear about a delay during direct examination or cross
examination. There is no reason to think that how or when the
jurors learn this information will change their attitudes about the
inferences to be drawn from the delay itself. This is the crucial
issue never recognized by Orenstein. It is not evidence law
preventing jurors from hearing about delayed reports that causes
victims to be regarded skeptically. They are regarded skeptically
because of societal attitudes as reflected in jury deliberations. 23
One of Orenstein's own examples illustrates this point. She
refers to "the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings to demonstrate
how delay in reporting hurts women's credibility. The senators,
and even Thomas himself, relied on Hill's delay to question her
memory, perception, and motives."24  If Hill's credibility was
questioned, it was not because she was prevented from stating
when or why she complained. As an evidentiary matter, her hear-
say was admitted, as Orenstein believes such hearsay should be.
Even so, some people, because that complaint was delayed, drew
negative inferences. Such conclusions came not from an evidence
21. See Taslitz, supra note 1, at 447 (noting that a common defense strategy in rape cases
is to establish the crime was not promptly reported).
22. Cf. Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 435 ("[J]udges
seldom find witnesses incompetent to testify; any gender bias in perceptions of credibility is
therefore likely to have its greatest impact when the jury is deliberating, and not when the
judge is determining competency.') (citing FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee's notes).
23. Cf. Baker, supra note 17, at 587. Baker reviews studies showing
that sixty-six percent of one sample group believed that women's behavior or
appearance provokes rape. Thirty-four percent believe that "women should be
held responsible for preventing their own rape." Another study found that
"most respondents, including victims, saw women's behavior and/or appearance
as the second most frequent cause of rape." A more recent survey of 500 adult
Americans found that thirty-eight percent of men and thirty-seven percent of
women believe that a woman is partly to blame for her own rape if she dresses
seductively. Given these perceptions, a victim's credibility may well be
irrelevant - many jurors are going to blame her anyway.
24. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 206 (citing Kim Lane Schepple, Just the Facts Ma'am:
Sexualized Violence, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 149 (1992)).
269
270 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 4:263
doctrine, but from the common belief that a delayed report should
be viewed skeptically.
If Orenstein really wants important change, it is not evidence
law that she should confront, but societal attitudes. Apparently,
even some people generally considered to be feminists draw nega-
tive inferences from a delayed report. A recent letter to the New
York Times by Mary Jean Tully, a former president of the NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund, states:
I feel certain that Paula Corbin Jones would indeed have found
... that feminism is sisterhood if she had brought charges
against Gov. Bill Clinton at the time of the alleged incident. By
waiting until he became President, she inevitably came across
as someone who seeks not justice and reparation but notoriety
and perhaps some political gain as well. Feminists could hardly
be expected to support a cause like this.25
In confronting societal attitudes, it is important to also
recognize that skepticism about delayed reporting is not confined to
statements made by alleged rape victims. For example, if a person
at trial said that the defendant pulled a gun and then snatched a
gold chain from the witness's neck, the witness's statement
reporting that incident six months after its occurrence would not be
admitted under the excited utterance exception. We might expect
a defense attorney to elicit the fact that the delayed report was the
first report to suggest to the jury that the witness was not
credible.26
Similar logic applies to defendants. The issue before the
Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Anderson was whether pre-arrest
silence could be used to impeach a criminal defendant consistently
25. Mary Jean Tully, Not Justice: Notoriety, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1997 at A20.
26. In a murder case, two witnesses were seen standing over the body as it lay on a street
in Brooklyn. Five days later, they said they had seen the defendant commit tle murder.
This statement, of course, was not admissible as an excited utterance, but I addressed it on
cross examination. I argued to the jury that if the witnesses had seen the defendant commit
the murder, they would have told the police immediately. Instead, I contended, the wit-
nesses realized that they were probably seen over the body and might be implicated in the
crime. The best way for them to avoid this was to implicate someone else, and they named
the defendant, even though the conditions they described would not have allowed for any
definite identification. The essence of the argument urged the jurors to be dubious because
of the delayed report. If the jury agreed, they were not doing something wrong. Most
assuredly, they were not somehow discriminating against women in accepting it. See People
v. Rivers, 85 A.D.2d 674, 445 N.Y.S.2d 196 (App. Div. 1981), rev'd, 109 A.D.2d 758, 486
N.Y.S.2d 73 (App. Div. 1985), remanded and acquitted, No. 3168-1978 (N.Y. King's County
July 17, 1986).
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with the Fifth Amendment.27 The Court held that it could, but the
relevance of the defendant's silence should be noted. At trial,
defendant claimed self-defense. He was cross-examined about the
fact that he did not immediately report that claim, but waited al-
most two weeks before asserting it. Because of the delayed report,
the prosecutor wanted the jury to be skeptical of the defendant's
claims, not an unnatural inference given the facts.2"
Orenstein seeks to imply that the doctrine of excited utterances
discriminates against rape victims by excluding delayed reports and
that skepticism about delayed reports is a male notion about
women reinforced in hearsay doctrine. In reality, evidence law
treats rape victims and their hearsay as it treats others.29 Further
27. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
28. See Davis v. State, 344 Md. 331, 686 A.2d 1083 (1996). The court held that a
defendant's alibi witness may be impeached with his failure to disclose the exculpatory
information prior to trial when there exists "a relationship between the witness and the
defendant, or circumstances, such that it would be the natural response of the witness to act
to exonerate the defendant .... Id. at 345, 686 A.2d at 1089.
29. Orenstein suggests that one reason excited utterances should be expanded is because
this exception discriminates against women generally. She states that powerful people may
speak out quickly against affronts, but they have not "notice[d] that their experiences are not
universal. But it is these very assumptions of normalcy, objectivity, and universality that
feminism challenges." Orenstein, supra note 1, at 210. Because the dominant group will
speak out quickly and have its hearsay admitted as excited utterances, those who do not
have power and respond to affronts differently should also have their hearsay admitted.
Of course, if correcting gender discrimination is the principle espoused here, and if it
turns out that the exception "excludes" typical male responses while including female-style
statements, then we ought to correct that imbalance by finding a way to admit more male-
styled assertions. Orenstein, however, suggests that excited utterances uniformly
discriminate against women.
[O]ne could postulate that the critique could apply to all utterances made by
women concerning startling events. If the willingness to make a quick, excited
declaration reflects a typically male conversational style, the excited utterance
rule would fail to describe the experiences of female witnesses in all types of
exciting events.
Id. at 211.
Orenstein concludes that men are more likely than women to respond reflexively to
affronts, but even if she were right about this, a proposition beyond proof, affronts are only
a small part of the universe of startling events that could trigger an excited utterance. Her
statement about the general effect of the exception goes counter to the male stereotype, or
the dominant view, which holds that women lose control more often than men, blurt out
more things than men, and therefore make more statements that would be classified as
excited utterances than men. A male view is that men are more likely to be stoics and
women hysterics. If you think of someone with a stiff upper lip, do you think of a man or a
woman? Who is supposed to bite a bullet and get on with it? Cf. Denise Reaume, What's
Distinctive About Feminist Analysis of Law?: A Conceptual Analysis of Women's Exclusion
from the Law, 2 LEGAL THEORY 265, 286 (1996) ('When Lord Denning describes a female
plaintiff, worried about cricket balls from a neighboring cricket pitch ending up in her back
garden, as 'a very sensitive lady who worked herself up into... a state,' he is very clearly
trading on traditional female stereotypes of hysteria and irrationality.") (quoting Miller v.
Jackson, 3 All E.R. 338, 345 (C.A. 1977)). If these stereotypes were correct, then the excited
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more, jury incredulity is not discrimination against rape victims; it
is only part of a general skepticism about delayed reports.
Orenstein's proposal is based upon misconceptions. She
misconceives the connection between credibility and hearsay. She
misconceives why delayed reporting by a rape victim is disbelieved.
She seeks to end a discrimination that does not exist.
If her proposal has merit, it is not for the reasons Orenstein
offers. Instead of ending a discrimination, we should be concerned
with finding a justification for a discrimination. We need grounds
for treating the alleged rape victim's hearsay differently from the
way we treat other similar hearsay. We need reasons to privilege
the rape claimant's hearsay.3 0 At times in her article, Orenstein
seems to indicate that this privilege is in order. Her basis for doing
so apparently comes from the rape trauma syndrome.
III. RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME AND EXCITED UTTERANCES
Orenstein contends that evidence law should reflect the
information learned from rape trauma syndrome research.31 Her
claim is that evidence law should be changed because rape trauma
syndrome establishes the reliability of the rape victim's delayed
utterance exception would apparently discriminate against men. Perhaps, then, the
exception should be changed to remedy this discrimination.
We, of course, do not know if this is the effect of the exception, but what would it
mean for this style of feminist theorizing if we concluded that the dominant group set up a
hearsay exception that disfavors its style of discourse in favor of a perceived female style?
30. If she is not seeking to discriminate in favor of the rape victim, then she should be
advocating the admissibility of all delayed reports, which she does not do. Cf. Dale A. Nance,
Foreword: Do We Really Want To Know the Defendant?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 13-14
(1994). Nance, discussing the proposal to permit other misconduct evidence in sexual offense
cases notes:
If the law is to have integrity, the proposal to exempt other misconduct
evidence in sexual offense cases must assume that the rationales of the general
exclusion are correct, at least in the sense of justifying on balance the
prohibition of other misconduct evidence when used to set up a propensity
inference; otherwise, the proper response is to repeal the prohibition entirely.
Id.
31. Orenstein notes that courts have admitted RTS evidence to dispel misconceptions
about how rape victims act, but have been reluctant to admit such evidence to prove that the
woman did not consent. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 202. Orenstein continues,
This debate on the scope of RTS expert testimony underscores the importance
of using the knowledge gained from RTS in more fundamental ways One
essential benefit of RTS research for evidence law stems from the information
rule drafters can learn and apply in devising evidence rules that reflect the
experience of survivors of rape and other sexual violence, and allow their voices
to be heard in the courtroom.
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assertions about the violence. As Orenstein presents it, this claim
is anything but self-evident:
Ironically, these unexcited, reflective statements -
described by RTS - that survivors make weeks or months after
the trauma are not admissible under the current evidentiary
scheme, even though their typicality makes them seem parti-
cularly trustworthy. The excited utterance exception, however,
does not include these clinically observed, delayed, calm state-
ments because of the time lag, as well as the declarant's lack of
visible excitement. The rule has the psychology backwards.
The rationale of the excited utterance exception rests on the
theory that sincerity is guaranteed, because the declarant did
not delay, or because any brief delay was mitigated by the
stress that precluded fabrication by the declarant. But in fact,
a rape survivor is more likely to be calm shortly after the
incident and is more likely to delay reporting the crime.32
Orenstein explains that the exception is based on a theory that
the danger of lessened sincerity increases with lengthened reflec-
tion, but she then follows with the non sequitur: "But in fact, a
rape survivor is more likely to be calm shortly after the incident
and is more likely to delay reporting the crime."3
Even if it were true that rape victims are more likely to be calm
in the aftermath of a sexual attack, that hardly makes the excep-
tion's psychology backwards. The excited utterance doctrine is not
predicated on the most frequent way people respond to any
particular stress, but on the notion that a particular response to
stress, the excited utterance, has a lessened sincerity danger.
Furthermore, even if delayed rape reports are trustworthy, the
psychology is still not backward. The backwardness claim implies
that delayed reports are reliable, but the non-reflective ones are
not. If this is indeed what Orenstein means by backwards, she
should make that clear, for it is a proposition that has tremendous
consequences for rape victims. Such an interpretation might lead
to a hearsay exception for the delayed rape report, but it also should
lead to more skepticism, and perhaps exclusion, of the immediate
report because of its unreliability.
Perhaps Orenstein does not really mean that the psychology is
backward, but instead intends to assert that while prompt reports
are trustworthy, delayed reports are even more so. She does state,
32. Id. at 200-01.
33. Id.
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"Ironically, these unexcited, reflective statements - described by
RTS - that survivors make weeks or months after the trauma are
not admissible under the current evidentiary scheme, even though
their typicality makes them seem particularly trustworthy.
3 4
Upon closer examination, Orenstein's sentence makes no claim
about the reliability of the delayed report, only that the reflective
statements "seem particularly trustworthy." Of course, because
they "seem" reliable does not make them so. Her indefinite
assertion is hardly a basis for admitting a class of hearsay unless
we are willing to admit anything that "seem[s] particularly trust-
worthy." 5 She does not explore the ramifications of that position,
but surely it would change our notions of admissible hearsay.
Perhaps Orenstein intended a more definite claim, but she
never actually asserts that the delayed reports are the most trust-
worthy ones, or are, at least, reliable. If actual, and not just
seeming, trustworthiness is the claim, the only possible grounds
offered by her for the reliability of delayed reports is their "typical-
ity." She never explores the ramifications of that justification for a
hearsay exception.
The typicality of a report, which is not the rationale for any
other exception, would breach the hearsay dike with a flood. For
those of us whose life is generally a routine, anything we say can be
regarded as typical. A typical response to the contention that a
contract was broken would be a claim that it was fulfilled. A typical
response to the accusation of a rape would be a denial. It could be
argued that the Post-its stuck to a computer monitor should be
admitted under a business records exception because they could be
as reliable as traditional business records. When pressed to show
that these records are truly trustworthy, the reply would be that
members of this office typically stick them there. If "typicality" is
to be equated with trustworthiness, it would make more sense just
to abandon the hearsay rule.
The paragraph suggests, without actually stating, that rape
trauma syndrome establishes the trustworthiness of the delayed
reports. If that is the claim, the documentation for it is lacking.
First, such substantiation would require a clear statement of what
constitutes rape trauma syndrome (RTS). Orenstein sees RTS, as
others do, as a subset of the more general post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD)."6 PTSD has spawned recent research. "Perhaps
34. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 200.
35. Id.
36. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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the most startling and challenging finding is that PTSD occurs in
only a minority of individuals exposed to trauma. The finding that
PTSD, especially chronic PTSD, is not a common response to
trauma was contrary to the implicit assumption" of the psychiatric
community.s7 Orenstein, however, says that ' RTS documents typ-
ical behavioral manifestations of survivors of rape.... "" The con-
flict between the assertion that RTS lessens "typical" responses and
PTSD research which shows that PTSD is not a common response
to trauma is not even noted, much less discussed. Furthermore,
Orenstein never defines the typical behavioral manifestations that
RTS documents. There are disagreements as to what behavior
constitutes RTS. For example, Orenstein describes the syndrome
as having, in effect, an acute reorganization phase.39 This is a
descriptive approach deriving from the original article on RTS by
Burgess and Holmstrom. 40  A recent review article about RTS
concludes, however, that although the Burgess and Holmstrom
"study was very important in heightening awareness about the
traumatic effects of rape, it was quite limited methodologically, and
many of its results have not been replicated. Subsequent research,
which is much more rigorous, conceptualizes rape trauma in terms
of specific symptoms rather than more general stages of recovery."'"
Consensus on those symptoms, however, has not been reached. The
result is that the term RTS may not have much of a fixed
meaning.42 Because RTS has multiple meanings, if one is to rely on
RTS, then one must specify which RTS is being used.43
37. Richard L. Newman & Rachel Yehuda, PTSD in Civil Litigation: Recent Scientific
and Legal Developments, 37 JURIMETRICS 257, 263 (1997).
38. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 200. See also Hunter, supra note 18, at 147 ("Rape
trauma syndrome (RTS) describes typical reactions to the experience of forced sexual
assault.').
39. See Orenstein, supra note 1, at 200.
40. Ann Wolbert Burgess & Lynda Lyttle Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 981 (1974).
41. Patricia A. Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of Case
Law and Psychological Research, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 299 (1992).
42. See id. at 304-05.
[E]xperts in recent cases have described a broad range of symptoms and
behaviors as consistent with RTS, some of which do not appear to be based on
research. Testimony that is not research based often seems to be prompted by
a defendant's claims that a complainant's behavior was inconsistent with
having been raped. If virtually any victim behavior is described as consistent
with RTS, the term soon will have little meaning.
See also id. at 299 ("RTS has several meanings in the literature.").
43. Cf. Newman & Yehuda, supra note 37, at 259 (quoting E.B. Blanchard et al., Effects
of Varying Scoring Rules of the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) for the Diagnosis
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Motor Vehicle Accident Victims, 33 BEHAV. RES. &
THEORY 471, 471 (1995)).
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At a minimum, Orenstein needs to say if delayed reporting is
an essential part of RTS. Indeed, she never states that delayed
reports are more frequent than immediate ones. She only claims
that a significant, but unspecified, percentage of rape reports are
delayed." It is one thing to say that research has shown that
women often delay reporting a rape (although good research would
quantify "often"); it is another to say that delayed reporting is part
of rape trauma syndrome. If it is a component, then those who
report rape immediately cannot have RTS, a position with enor-
mous implications for rape cases.45 If delayed reporting is not part
of RTS, then it is hard to see how RTS can tell us that delayed
reports are the most trustworthy.
If Orenstein's proposal hinges on empirical evidence about how
rape victims act, then she should make that clear and fairly present
the relevant information. If the empirical basis is incomplete or
does not support the arguments, then that should be revealed with
reasons as to why those deficiencies do not matter. Orenstein has
not done that; selecting a quote or two about rape victims from the
literature does not suffice.
[The psychiatric definition of PTSD] offered no guidelines on how to use or
apply the diagnosis, creating the potential for over- or under-diagnosing based
upon the decision as to whether a particular symptom is present to a sufficient
degree or not .... The subjectivity inherent in the diagnosis has led to
criticism that the diagnosis of PTSD is subject to bias, distortion, and
misinterpretation and could reflect a patient's malingering.
Id.
44. Orenstein states that "a rape survivor is more likely to be calm shortly after the
incident and is more likely to delay reporting the crime." Orenstein, supra note 1, at 201.
What is being compared is not clear. She could mean that the person who is raped is more
likely to be calm and delay reporting than a person who has a consensual sexual encounter
and falsely claims rape. If that is her point, then Orenstein presumably should support
informing the jury that a woman who is immediately upset and announces rape is less likely
to have been raped than a woman who was calm and delayed.
Perhaps, however, her claim is that a rape victim is more likely to be calm than upset
after the attack and more likely to delay reporting it than immediately recounting it. This
claim of course says nothing about the reliability of rape reports, whether delayed or not.
Even so, Orenstein's documentation here is off the mark. She cites authorities at this point
for the propositions that rape victims "often" delay reporting and that a "substantial number"
of rape victims delay reporting. No figures are given to support the contention that it is
"more likely," no matter what the intended comparison group, that the report is delayed. She
goes on to cite statistics that in one group who delayed reporting, 73% knew their assailant
while only 50% who knew their assailant reported it promptly. These numbers, of course,
tell us nothing about what percentage delayed reporting. Furthermore, no citation is given
at all for the claim that it is "more likely" that a woman is calm after being raped. See
Orenstein, supra note 1, at 201 n.158.
45. Frazier and Borgida report that while there is delayed reporting, which is more
frequent when the victim knows her attacker, but "whether this behavior is part of RTS is
questionable .. " Frazier & Borgida, supra note 40, at 304.
1997] IS THIS HOW A FEMINIST ANALYZES EXCITED UTTERANCES?
Such selective use of social science literature in legal analysis
might be termed "social science lite" or "legal social science."46 The
hallmark of this practice is to develop a legal position first, and
then search for some empirical support for that position. When
such findings are located, the researcher stops searching, and the
results are presented as if the position were derived from that data.
A misleading presentation of empirical information can result in a
widespread problem. Just as it is too common for legal scholars to
search some historical record for a quote that supports their
position without understanding or presenting the full context of the
historical record,4 7 evidence scholars may too frequently use social
science in a selective and misleading manner. Perhaps because we
are not trained in searching social science reports or for other
reasons, we can too easily stop when a desirable reference is found
without any attempt to survey the rest of the relevant literature.
Presumably as evidence scholars, however, we take the process
of determining facts seriously, and "social science lite" ought to give
us concern. In litigation, if attorneys urge the court to change the
law, they have duties to search for and present both the favorable
and unfavorable authorities. It is doubtful that attorneys feel that
same sense of duty when advocating through academic writing. In
court, the dangers of distortion by a selective presentation of
information are reduced by the adversary system; opposing counsel
is expected to search for and present the unfavorable authority. As
46. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 526 (1995) (stating that many who use history in constitutional theory
have "habits of poorly supported generalization - which at times fall below even the
standards of undergraduate history writing"). See also Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court:
An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (describing "law office history").
47. See Kelly, supra note 45, at 122 n.13 (Law office history is characterized by "the
selection of data favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or concern for
contradictory data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered."). See also
Flaherty, supra note 45, at 553-54. Flaherty states that good legal history requires a
thorough reading, or at least citation, of both primary and secondary source
material generally recognized by historians as central to a given question ....
Another procedural corollary requires viewing, or at least attempting to view,
events, ideas, and controversies in a larger context. Here legal scholars, in
what in its worst form is dubbed "law office history," notoriously pick and
choose facts and incidents ripped out of context that serve their purposes. In
a phrase, persuasive historical procedure dictates genuine concern for facts,
sources, and context.
Id. See also Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law,
71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 934 n.103 (1996) ("The politically motivated resurgence of
originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation has generated what is now a very
large body of legal scholarship - history-in-law - that is (a) quite bad according to
historians' standards, and (b) published in the most prestigious law reviews.").
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a consequence, the proponent of a position has an incentive to look
for all the authority.48
This adversary dynamic does not automatically exist in aca-
demic writing. If the author does not fully and fairly present the
relevant information, the reader, unlike a judge, may never learn
of the unfavorable authority.49 This, perhaps, should put an even
greater ethical duty on the academic than on the litigator to seek
and present all the relevant information. The dangers of incom-
plete information are only compounded by the fact that most of us
may not be especially competent to find, present, and evaluate such
information.5 °
Certainly, the claim that research has shown delayed rape
reports as the most trustworthy accounts of such incidents is one
that should be examined closely. Such research requires the ability
to determine the historical truth of an often complex event happen-
ing days, weeks, or months before.51 Any assertion that a research-
er has a trustworthy method for determining historical truth will
be controversial.52 Determining this truth is similar to determining
48. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 46, at 917-18 ("[L]aw-office history that disregards contrary
evidence and the like is not very good advocacy .... Truly effective law-office history
acknowledges the contradictory data and explains them away.").
49. See Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal
Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 136. In writing
about child custody determinations, Fineman & Opie state
[O]ne should be aware that any legal author or policy-maker who already has
a strong leaning toward a particular mode of custody resolution, can easily find
social science data, often researched within a different context, to illustrate and
support a particular rule. Those readers without a social science background,
or who lack the time to refer to the original research, are not in a position to
criticize such selections adequately.
Id. See also Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Using Social Science Research in Family
Law Analysis and Formation: Problems and Prospects, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 631, 665
(1995). Ramsey and Kelly characterize Fineman and Opie's approach to empirical data as
an "anecdotal approach to social science" which
judges research by its results in relation to their vision of women's interests,
rather than by scientific or other epistemological criteria. This approach uses
social science research like anecdotes or cases that can be employed to support
a particular feminist political position. Since both the research and the
selection process is value-laden, studies can be used selectively without the
need to justify selection or omission in relation to scientific community norms
governing research reviews.
Id.
50. Cf. NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW 164
(1995) ("[C]onducting a social science analysis proved easier than conducting it well.").
51. See Marianne Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60
WASH. L. REV. 331, 331 (1985) ("By 'historical truth' I mean the question of what really
happened in the world.').
52. See, e.g., id. at 353 (suggesting that "the psychoanalyst is equipped neither by
training nor by method for the detection of historical truth").
1997] IS THIS HOW A FEMINIST ANALYZES EXCITED UTTERANCES?
the cause of a medical symptom, and as hard fought litigation over
toxic torts, breast implants, and Bendectin indicates, such a task is
daunting.
Indeed, even divining the cause of simple symptoms for legal
purposes is not easy. For example, an expert may be able to tell us
that a mark on a body is a bruise. As time passes, however, it
becomes less likely that the expert can tell whether the bruise came
from a baseball bat or a stumble into a picnic table. The expert
could state with less certainty that a bruise was inflicted without
consent, and the expert would have even more difficulty saying
what the intent was of the person who inflicted the bruise.53
Moreover, any conclusions about the historical truth of what caused
a bodily mark must be even more doubtful when the expert's data
consists of only the victim's descriptions of the alleged cause. The
researcher confronts a task of at least as much complexity when
trying to determine the trustworthiness of delayed reports of rape.
Properly conducted studies may be able to tell us how often
people delay reporting rape and what behaviors and symptoms rape
claimants manifest. A whole other order of studies would be
required to conclude that what was reported about an incident is
accurate. If such studies exist, they should contain much valuable
information, such as how often delayed reports are trustworthy and
how often immediate ones are not, as well as many worthwhile
correlations. For example, it would be valuable to know whether
trustworthiness varies with age, extent of injury, marital status,
and other factors.
I doubt that RTS and related research demonstrate the key to
divining historical truth, RTS is not some sort of psychological truth
machine. If Orenstein bases her proposal on RTS having these
properties, then she should present all the data so we can make
more significant strides in producing accurate trials than just
admitting more hearsay into them.54 In any event, the contention
53. An expert might state that a person covered with bruises was unlikely to have
consented to the behavior that caused those injuries and that whoever inflicted them is
unlikely to have inflicted them unintentionally. This conclusion, however, does not require
expertise and could be reached just as easily by the non-expert.
54. In a footnote, Orenstein states, "[t]here is also psychological evidence that traumatic
events can be emblazoned on one's memory, but for this to happen, the survivor must first
have time to process the information." Orenstein, supra note 1, at 200 n.154. "Flashbulb
memories" are the result. This reference, too, is made selectively and without context.
The flashbulb effect was coined in 1977. See Roger Brown & James Kulik, Flashbulb
Memories, 5 COGNITION 73, 73 (1977). The term has usually been used for the crystalline
memories people have for "the circumstances in which [they] first learned of a very sur-
prising and consequential (or emotionally arousing) event." Id. The notion that there is a
special psychological mechanism for creating and preserving such accurate memories has
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that delayed reports are the "most trustworthy" accounts is not
supported in her article.
55
IV. THE PROPOSAL FOR SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVIVOR'S STATEMENT
Orenstein eventually concludes that the excited utterance
exception should be altered.56 She includes in her expanded
spawned innovative research in recent years, much of which is collected in AFFECT AND
ACCURACY IN RECALL: STUDIES OF "FLASHBULB" MEMORIES (Eugene Winograd & Ulric
Neisser eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) [hereinafter AFFECT AND ACCURACY]. This
research approaches a consensus: "[1]t seems clear that a careful analysis of [Brown and
Kulik's] paper shows that the theory is inconsistent, that the data presented in the paper are
not appropriate for testing the theory, and that for the few instances where there is relevant
data it sometimes goes against the theory." William F. Brewer, The Theoretical and
Empirical Status of the Flashbulb Memory Hypothesis, in id. at 282. Researchers testing the
reliability of flashbulb memories have found that such memories, while confidently held, are
inaccurate. One study concluded that only seven percent of the flashbulb memories
examined were not wrong to a greater or lesser extent. See Ulric Neisser & Nicole Harsch,
Phantom Flashbulbs: False Recollections of Hearing the News About the Challenger 9, in id.
at 18. When "vivid and confident flashbulb recollections [are] mistaken... the original
memories seem to have disappeared entirely ...." Id. at 30.
If we are of a certain age, we have vivid memories of where we were when we heard
Kennedy or Reagan was shot; but some of the details of what we "remember" are likely to be
wrong, according to this research. Research on flashbulb memories indicates that there is
not a special memory for traumatic events. On the contrary, such memories, like other
memories, are reconstructive. See Daniel B. Wright, Recall of the Hillsborough Disaster Over
Time: Systematic Biases of 'Flashbulb'Memories, 7 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 129, 136
(1993).
This study is part of a growing literature demonstrating that a special
mechanism of the type postulated by Brown and Kulik ... is not supported for
the class of memories which it is purported to explain. This study adds to the
field by presenting data that are best explained by relying on reconstructive
memory processes.
Id. All of this does not rule out the possibility of a special memory for rape, but Orenstein's
article does not present information to support such a claim.
55. Cf Steven M. Southwick et al., Consistency of Memory for Combat-Related Traumatic
Events in Veterans of Operation Desert Storm, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 173 (1997). In this
study of the consistency of memory for serious combat-related traumatic events, subjects
completed questionnaires about their combat experiences one month after the war and again
two years later. The researchers found that 88% of the subjects reported inconsistent
memories with 46% of the subjects reporting one or more traumatic events after one month
that they did not recall two years later. Id. at 174. Furthermore, 70% reported events at two
years that they had not reported after one month. Id. The researchers concluded:
These inconsistencies raise doubts about the reliability of memory for combat.
... That memory for traumatic events frequently changed over time suggests
that the search for historical 'truth' may be fraught with complexity.... Mhis
study suggests that the relationship between development of PTSD and level
of combat exposure is not as clear as previously believed. Factors other than
combat, such as childhood trauma and preexisting personality may also play an
important part in symptom development.
Id. at 175-76.
56. Orenstein suggests that the rationale for the excited utterance exception is faulty,
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definition: "Sexual violence survivor's statement. A statement
concerning a sexual assault, made by the survivor concerning the
event or its effect on the survivor."57 This proposal raises several
problems and issues apart from its wobbly foundation.
First of all, Orenstein's proposal admits survivor's statements,
explaining that "survivor shall mean an adult who has experienced
sexual assault as defined" by state or federal criminal law.58
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), however, requires the trial judge
to determine whether the elements of a hearsay exception have
been met. This means that before the new hearsay can be admit-
ted, the judge has to determine by a preponderance of proof that the
declarant was sexually attacked. 9 Even though Orenstein indi-
cates that rape victims' statements are not heard because courts are
hostile to the delayed reporting of sexual attacks, she gives courts
the duty to decide whether the delayed reporters were raped.' Like
much else that is troubling in her proposal, Orenstein fails to
address this apparent conflict.
Orenstein also blithely concludes that the "survivor's exception
could be adopted without undue hardship on criminal defen-
dants...." 1 She does this by limiting inquiry to Sixth Amendment
noting that the time necessary to fabricate a story is often only seconds while the exception
routinely admits statements made thirty minutes after a startling event. Furthermore,
stress, even if it does help to guarantee sincerity, may increase the likelihood of
misperception and memory flaws. See Orenstein, supra note 1, at 178, 180. Having
recognized reasons to doubt the rationale behind the excited utterances doctrine, however,
Orenstein still advocates its extension.
57. Id. at 213. Her proposal, while adding a new category of statements to the exception,
would narrow existing excited utterances by requiring that the declarant be proven
unavailable or else be available for cross examination before an assertion is admitted. She
also narrows existing doctrine by requiring a prosecutor to give advanced written notice to
the criminal defendant of the intention to offer an excited utterance. See id. at 214.
58. Id. at 213. Although her expanded exception is limited to adults, when she discusses
the practical effects of her proposal, she states, 'The proposed survivor's exception would
probably serve children well, particularly those deemed unavailable to testify." Id. at 221.
Because her proposal would not authorize the admission of statements from children, it is
hard to see how it would serve them well. She does not explain further.
59. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
60. Cf. Baker, supra note 17, at 613 ("Judges, who are influenced by the same rape myths
and cultural norms that affect jurors, may not use [their] discretion appropriately.").
61. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 216. Orenstein states she "uses the term 'survivor' rather
than 'victim' to refer to someone who has experienced sexual violence. This choice reflects
an attempt to avoid the stigma of victimization and to honor the people who survive the
ordeal of rape." Orenstein, supra note 1, at 164 n.5. Using the term "survivor," however,
implies that we know that the alleged victim has, in fact, been raped. She uses the word as
a synonym for rape claimant without acknowledging that under her proposal the judge has
to determine that the alleged victim is a survivor. For example, she says, "In State v.
Chapin, 826 P.2d 194 (Wash. 1992), the court held that the statement of a male rape survivor
did not qualify under the excited utterance exception." Id. at 201 n.155. She calls him a
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Confrontation Clause concerns, but even this limited consideration
is unclear. The major confrontation problem, as Orenstein sees it,
would arise when a declarant is unavailable to testify.62 This
problem is solved, she maintains, by her requirement that a
statement from an absent declarant be admissible "only if the court
finds that circumstances surrounding its making indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement."63 While Idaho v. Wright 4
indicates that evidence under a hearsay exception has to demon-
strate such reliability to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, her
requirement once again raises questions as to what the basis is for
the expanded hearsay exception. Orenstein argues that delayed
statements about a sexual assault are, as a class, reliable. Indeed,
if, as a class they are not trustworthy, why admit this hearsay? If
this hearsay as a class is reliable, however, then confrontation
should be satisfied without any further particularized inquiry.
Even so, Orenstein requires an individualized determination of
reliability when the declarant is absent. On the one hand she
seems to contend that the hearsay as a class is reliable; on the
other, she indicates that it is not. This raises yet again the question
of what the rationale is for her proposal?
Furthermore, if Orenstein is saying that before the absent
declarant's statements can be admitted, a court must determine on
a case by case basis that the circumstances of the hearsay's making
indicate trustworthiness, then such hearsay would already seem to
survivor, but it is hardly clear that the label fits. The declarant had Alzheimer's disease and,
because he frequently wandered, often had to be restrained by male attendants. Several
times in the course of a day he showed anger toward the defendant, a male attendant. His
wife asked why he did not like the defendant, and he responded, "Raped me." The court in
determining that this was not an excited utterance concluded that the declarant
was confused, prone to confabulation, subject to persecutory delusions [and] .
.hostile in particular to male attendants. [He] made the statement... after
calming down from being angry, not from being excited, and in response to a
question from his wife. In addition, [his] anger was elicited not by any startling
event, but by seeing Chapin, which was a normal part of [his] life... and which
had occurred at least twice previously that day. These factors leave us
persuaded that [his] statement was not a spontaneous and reliable utterance
made while he was under the stress of excitement caused by the occurrence of
a startling event.
826 P.2d at 199. At trial, the declarant did not testify because he was incompetent. Labeling
this declarant with the conclusory tag "survivor" makes it seem as if the court was callously
enforcing hearsay technicalities to the detriment of rape victims, when in fact the court was
faced with a very difficult issue. This would have been an interesting case for Orenstein to
analyze under her proposal. She did not do this.
62. See Orenstein, supra note 1 at 217, 219.
63. Id. at 213.
64. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
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be admissible under the residual hearsay exception.65 Presumably
she does not think her proposal for absent declarants is superflu-
ous, but again she does not address this problem.
By limiting her concern for hardships to confrontation concerns,
she avoids other fairness issues. Her proposal "eliminates all
timing requirements"' and therefore permits the admission of any
statement about the incident that was uttered before the testimony.
Assertions to roommates, spouses, parents, children, friends, and
acquaintances all become admissible, not just statements made to
the police or health professionals. Indeed, even statements made
to a prosecutor during trial preparation could be admitted under
Orenstein's proposed changes. The possibilities of admissible
hearsay are limited only by the number of times the rape claimant
can tell someone about the incident.67 Claimants can manufacture
hearsay for the express purpose of having it presented at trial.
Such widespread admissible hearsay could be misleading
because the jury might forget that the worth of the statements
depends on the credibility of just one person and also because such
evidence inevitably will be one-sided. The jury will hear statements
that support the prosecution's case, but will not be exposed to
comparable contradictory ones. Defendants have almost no chance
of learning in a trustworthy manner about unrecorded prior
statements, especially those made to roommates, spouses, lovers,
friends, and acquaintances. When inconsistent statements are
made to such people, the jury is unliely to hear them. Furthermore,
much of the truly important hearsay may have be uttered in a
privileged setting, such as to a rape 'counselor. Since it will be the
rape claimant who controls the privilege, we can expect the
privilege to be waived only for the confirmatory statements and not
the contradictory ones.68 The jury, as a result, will hear of the
65. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). Courts, in deciding whether hearsay proffered under
Rule 804(b)(5) should be admitted have been most concerned with that Rule's requirement
that the hearsay have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" to other
admissible hearsay. See Jonakait, supra note 8, at 440.
66. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 215.
67. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is the only restriction proposed for this stream of prior
statements, and Orenstein suggests Rule 403 should be used sparingly, if at all. "Statements
by the rape or other sexual violence survivor that are merely cumulative are probably
excludable under Rule 403, although the possibility that a survivor's additional declarations
would not affect credibility seems unlikely unless they were truly numerous and entirely
redundant." Id. at 218-19 (emphasis added).
68. See Euphemia B. Warren, Note, She's Gotta Have It Now: A Qualified Rape Crisis
Counselor-Victim Privilege, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 146-47 (1995) (stating that 24 states
have enacted rape crisis counselor-victim privileges, with 16 of them being absolute, in the
sense that they prohibit any disclosure without the victim's consent).
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consistent statement made to the roommate or the counselor
because the rape claimant will tell the prosecutor. Jurors are
unlikely, however, to learn of comparable, inconsistent statements.
Orenstein never considers the possible unfairness resulting from
this stream of incomplete, one-sided evidence.69
What is perhaps most disappointing about the proposal is that
it would give the false illusion that some major stride had been
made in addressing a problem, when the real issue has not been
addressed. If rape victims are wrongly denigrated when they delay
reporting the attack, the mere expansion of a hearsay exception will
have little effect. Attitudes need changing, but a significant change
will not come from admitting on direct examination what is now
elicited on cross examination. An expanded hearsay exception does
not undercut the defense argument about delayed reporting; the
admission of solid information about rape victims might.
Jurisdictions that allow expert testimony to dispel jurors'
misconceptions about the responses of rape victims provide a way
to admit solid information about rape victims.70 Expert testimony,
however, costs money and takes time, and there is a limited supply
of experts. I doubt the myth-dispelling information is being
presented in every trial that might benefit from it. Instead of
spending time on the hearsay proposal, we ought to be devising
additional ways to collect trustworthy information about rape
victims and finding ways to educate juries (and police, prosecutors,
and judges) efficiently, fully, and fairly about the responses of rape
victims.7
69. Orenstein's proposal will also encourage more declarants to be unavailable than now.
She states that "it is hard to imagine a prosecution for rape or any other violent or sexual
crime where a survivor, available to testify, would not be called." Orenstein, supra note 1,
at 220-21. She also concedes that "the proposal allows for the possibility that because of
injury, intimidation, or emotional trauma the survivor will be deemed unavailable to testify."
Id. Conviction without confrontation will then be a possible result.
While today the prosecutor who desires a conviction is unlikely to easily accept the
declarant as unable to testify for reasons of intimidation or trauma and will push and
reassure to get her on the stand, tomorrow the prosecutor might more readily accept that she
is unavailable because multitudinous hearsay versions of her story can be admitted. Even
if the declarant just refuses to testify, making her unavailable, it is hard to picture many
courts meting out a serious contempt citation to an alleged rape victim. The end result is
that more declarants will become unavailable under her proposal.
70. See Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric
Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1271, 1321-23 (1994) (collecting cases where courts
have admitted rape trauma syndrome evidence and noting that most states only admit such
evidence to correct jurors' misconceptions about how rape victims act).
71. Cf. Hunter, supra note 18, at 140 ("A more immediate way of challenging
assumptions about consent in rape cases is to introduce expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome ....").
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V. FEMINISM AND HEARSAY
Orenstein also claims that her proposal, although limited to
one hearsay issue, flows out of broader feminist principles.7" These
tenets, however, if actually taken seriously, could produce wide
evidentiary changes, which she does not assess.
For example, Orenstein gives a feminist critique of the hearsay
rule and concludes that the evidence doctrine bolsters unequal
relationships:
72. Orenstein maintains that acontextualism is "inimical to the feminine voice."
Orenstein, supra note 1, at 194. Nonetheless, important context is missing from her critique
of the excited utterance rule. After she notes that the excited utterances hearsay exception
persists even though its rationale has been strongly criticized, she concludes that a feminist
analysis can explain the tenacity of the doctrine, by showing how the exception
relies on narrow and unconsciously gendered notions of how normal, honest
people react to stress. In particular, the excited utterance exception subtly
undermines women's credibility by endorsing social expectations and
perpetuating legal and cultural norms that conflict with experiences of
survivors of sexual violence .... [It also] perpetuates stereotypes that allow
society to discredit women and to deny the pervasiveness of rape and other
sexual violence in our society.
Id. at 222.
Perhaps this is true, but if the feminist methodology abhors acontextualism, then excited
utterances should not be treated as isolated from the rest of the evidence rules. Instead, this
exception's context should be examined. Cf. Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc
Determinations: Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 IND. L.J. 551, 591 (1996)
(stating that evidentiary provisions should not be treated as separate texts, but interpreted
as part of one set of rules). That context, which includes the evidence rules as a whole and
their history, presents a different, and simpler, picture.
Orenstein suggests that excited utterances have a special hold because they persist
despite criticism. When taken in a broader historical context, however, it is typical that once
an exception is established, it is not abolished or even narrowed. History only shows the
creation of new exceptions and the expansion of existing ones. For example, the rationale
for dying declarations might be questioned, but the exception continues to exist. Indeed the
Federal Rules' version of dying declarations expands upon the common law. Similarly, the
rationale for coconspirator statements is a farce, but they continue to exist. A historical
examination would show a present sense impression exception that did not exist at the
beginning of the century, and a learned treatise exception in the federal rules that did not
exist at common law. The historical context would also find an expanding statement against
interest exception. In this context, the excited utterance exception has no special hold.
Hearsay exceptions are not abolished. They seem only to be created and expanded.
This trend in hearsay is only part of the broader context of the rules as a whole, which as
a general matter, have tended to allow the admission of ever more evidence. The more
interesting analysis is not why excited utterances continue, but why a handful of doctrines
have been adopted which have narrowed the admission of evidence as compared to previous
law. A hostility toward women in evidence law would explain little of these narrowed rules.
It is hard to see a hostility to women behind Federal Rule 408, which allows less evidence
regarding attempts to settle cases than the common law. Women's suppression definitely
has not motivated the creation of rape-shield laws or most new privileges.
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It perpetuates the power of a professional elite whose knowl-
edge of its arcane rules makes lawyers indispensable, if
incomprehensible .... It serves to reinforce hierarchy and to
perpetuate reliance on professionals, who tend to be predomi-
nantly male .... [The hearsay rule can [also] be criticized for
its complexity, rigidity, and lack of reliance on context."3
There is force in these criticisms, 4 but Orenstein does not
address solutions for the alienating and arcane hearsay framework.
To change the situation we could either abolish the rule or establish
more fluid exceptions. If the hearsay prohibition vanished, either
all relevant hearsay would be admitted or a judge would make ad
hoc admissibility determinations using Rule 403 or some similar
rule. It is doubtful that efficiency concerns would allow the
admission of all relevant hearsay; trials would become even longer.
If, however, unrestricted admissibility was permitted, the system
that would further favor the rich and powerful because the amount
of hearsay a litigant could discover or manufacture would correlate
with that party's power and wealth. While intended to eliminate
hierarchy, Orenstein's proposal would only perpetuate hierarchy.
If we used a rule similar to 403 to control the broad admissibil-
ity of hearsay, or if we have more fluid exceptions, we cede more
power to judges. The more open-ended a rule is, the more it is
subject to differing interpretations. The more a rule can be
interpreted in various ways, the more power the interpreter has.
Orenstein is concerned that the hearsay rule "perpetuate[s] reliance
on courtroom professionals, who tend to be predominantly male."75
Whether judges are male or not, a hearsay structure that gives
more discretion to judges increases the hierarchical power of
judges.7"
Furthermore, while the simpler written rules might seem to
decrease complexity, a different type of complexity would evolve.
73. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 192-93.
74. The criticisms are overdrawn when considering the hearsay exceptions. While rigid
boundaries might be intended for them, the exceptions are about context. It is generally
determined whether something falls within an exception by examining the context in which
it was uttered.
75. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 192.
76. See Kinports, supra note 22, at 420 ("[L]eaving the evidentiary rules to the sole
discretion of judges, most of whom are upper- or middle-class white men, will tend to
perpetuate a traditional male perspective, leading to discrimination against women."). See
also id. at 422-23 ('Although complete judicial discretion or outright abolition of the evidence
rules might be even more consistent with a contextual feminist approach, imposing limits
is necessary in a world where judges and jurors are infected by the society's gendered
attitudes.").
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Litigators would try to predict how evidence law would be applied
by each trial judge. Every courtroom, even more than now, would
have its own evidence law. This unrecorded law would be hard to
determine. In a desire to simplify, one complexity would be
supplanted by another."
Orenstein also states that "a feminist method can question the
hearsay rule for its resulting loss of information and silencing of
voices outside the formal courtroom setting."78 She continues that
"[m]uch excluded hearsay evidence consists of informal communica-
tion - gossip, casual statements to friends .... ." and, since such
hearsay has been a traditional way for women to communicate and
learn about the world, "[t]he hearsay prohibition . . . sacrifices
potentially useful information packaged in a form familiar to and
comfortable for women. 79
The consequences of this feminist concern, which Orenstein
does not explore, could be far-reaching. For example, the maxim
concerning the loss of information from informal communication
suggests that the general ban on character evidence should not
exist, for what is a reputation if it is not gossip and casual state-
ments among friends? Indeed, taking this principle seriously
suggests that rape-shield laws should be reversed.
Feminists also ought to examine carefully the consequences of
unleashing voices silenced by the hearsay rule. Orenstein wants
the jury to hear the rape victim's voice, but in fact the jury now
generally hears it because victims testify.
The voice often not heard at trials, however, is the criminal
defendant's. This perhaps is not caused by the hearsay rule.
Maybe the defendant's voice is stilled because he exercises his right
against self-incrimination and because evidence doctrines allow the
jury to hear about past crimes and misdeeds only if he testifies.
Without the hearsay rule, however, the jury would regularly hear
this frequently absent voice. If feminism is truly concerned about
the loss of hearsay and inaudible voices, it should be advocating to
make hearsay from the accused admissible.8 °
77. Cf. id. at 425 ("Although the law of evidence can be made less inaccessible and
therefore less hierarchical by eliminating some of the needless complexity in the rules, the
most straightforward approach to evidence would be to give the judge or jury complete
discretion, which is problematic. .. .'.
78. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 194.
79. Id. at 194-95.
80. Similarly, if these feminist principles were seriously held, feminists should try to
narrow privileges. Privileges, like the hearsay rule, mute voices. People still testify, but the
whole story is not presented; the information lost is, in fact, generally hearsay; and for a
privilege like the rape counselor privilege, that muted hearsay voice is a woman's. Cf.
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VI. FEMINIST PRINCIPLES AND FEMINIST POLITICS
Broad principles intended to be widely and neutrally applied,
however, do not really'seem to drive this proposal.81 If they did,
Orenstein would show more concern for consequences. Instead,
Orenstein's goal seems to be the inclusion of specific information in
a specific context. She would like to be able to admit the victim's
supporting hearsay in sexual assault trials. The real engine is the
desire to shift the balance in rape trials.82 The foundation of her
proposal is not principles, but politics.8"
That motive, instead of being hidden as if unworthy, should be
recognized.84 There is nothing wrong with advocating a power shift
Kinports, supra note 22, at 440 ("As a general matter, privilege rules might be seen as
furthering feminist principles because they value the preservation of relationships over the
admission of relevant evidence.').
81. Cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 2151, 2153-54 (1995).
[B]road propositions do not solve concrete cases; or they solve too many case
very poorly. ... Despite the undoubted importance of theoretical insight, the
most effective tools of reform at the present juncture are likely to be eclectic
and atheoretical, and the most effective feminist scholarship is likely to be one
that attends to the complexities of specific institutions and procedures. What
is needed, I suggest, is a feminism of particulars, a recognition that real
solutions are likely to lie deeply embedded in the details.
82. Orenstein comes closest to acknowledging that a power shift is her real goal when she
says that feminists "argue that any attempt to identify neutral reality or objective truth is
fruitless, and that the assumptions underlying the goals of objectivity and neutrality are not
only unfounded, but inevitably reflect gender power differences." Orenstein, supra note 1,
at 189. If a feminist holds these views, then she would not advocate changing evidence rules
to allow trials to move towards neutral reality or objective truth because that could not be
done. The rules should be modified only to alter a gender power difference. Accepting this
position is dangerous for feminism because this view indicates that there is no reason to
believe a woman is telling "the truth" when she says that she was raped. See Mary I.
Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 280 n.9 (1993).
When I refer to women's 'true stories' I am claiming, first, that women's
assertions that they were sexually violated are almost always an accurate
representation of what they felt. I thus reject the broadest versions of
postmodern feminism that seem to assume that all descriptions are linguistic
constructions with no clear linkage to material reality.
Id.
83. In using the term "politics" here I am following Robert Mosteller who describes "the
increasing impact of political influences on evidence law." Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes
and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 465-66 (1996). He goes
to say, '"Politicar is a broad term that includes not only the exercise of self-interested power
by groups but also the process by which a moral component may be identified and
incorporated into the law." Id. at 465 n.15.
84. Orenstein states, "Feminist method[s] seek... to examine how purportedly neutral
rules may discriminate against women." Orenstein, supra note 1, at 162. She argues that
the purportedly neutral excited utterance exception discriminates against women.
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in rape trials.8 5 Certainly the historic balance was wrong, and
perhaps it still is. Indeed, only if we forthrightly advocate the
change can we confront the truly crucial questions that Orenstein
does not face. Are the scales wrongly tilted in rape trials, and if so,
is this a good way to alter them? 6
Acknowledging the motivation can also help prevent unantici-
pated results. When we just seek to alter the balance of power in
specific kinds of cases, we can cabin the consequences. The reform
is naturally limited to the defined set. When, however, it is
contended that general principles and methods compel a change,
Subsequently, she suggests a remedy. While she does not see the excited utterance exception
as gender neutral because of its discriminatory impact, she pronounces that her proposal,
whose goal is to admit more hearsay from women, is gender neutral. She asserts that this
is because
in the tradition of the evidence rules, the proposal is gender neutral. Rape
Trauma Syndrome is based on Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome generally, and
there is reason to believe that men experience rape and other sexual violence
as traumatic and may, because of shame, exhibit many of the less powerful
speaking styles associated with women.
Id. at 218. She comes to the contradictory position that a rule neutral on its face is
discriminatory because it adversely affects women, even though it may also affect some men
in the same way, but a remedy is neutral even if it primarily aids women because it also aids
some men. Such contradiction disappears if she acknowledges that it is not neutral
principles driving the proposal, but a desire to alter a power balance.
85. Professor Mosteller suggests one reason that the battered woman's syndrome has
been widely admitted, even though its scientific basis is not as strong as other evidence that
is often excluded, is "politics. Society has arrived at a basic political judgment: the balance
of advantage should be shifted in litigation in favor of battered women who respond violently
to their batterers." Mosteller, supra note 82, at 485.
86. Cf. David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases,
78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 583 (1994).
If one thinks of rape as a crime similar to other violent felonies, comparable to
homicide or nonsexual assault, for example, one is more likely to accept the idea
that the character reasoning rules should be consistent across various crimes.
If one regards rape as a society-defining crime, part of a system of oppression
that promotes male supremacy, then one may think that the need to increase
the conviction rate is greater than the need to maintain consistency across the
law of character evidence and greater than the need to avoid speculative
dangers of prejudice in the fact-finding process. As usual, beliefs about
substance overwhelm beliefs about process.
Id. See also Nance, supra note 30, at 12-13. Nance states that the arguments for the special
need for evidence of prior sexual assault can mean two different things:
On the one hand, they can mean that there is a special need to suppress
sexual assault. Before that can be accepted as an argument for admitting
evidence, one must answer the question of why the best way to suppress a
given type of crime is by making it easier to convict that class of defendants, as
opposed, for example, to stiffening penalties or otherwise encouraging
prosecutions ....
On the other hand, the argument from special need can be aimed at the
peculiar epistemic features of the cases under consideration.
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others may actually take those principles and methods seriously
and apply them elsewhere. When we offer principles to justify
political decisions, reform can spring out of its initial confines into
unforeseen territories."7
For example, Orenstein's reliance on rape trauma syndrome
has far-ranging implications."8 Although she never commits herself
as to what RTS is, Orenstein suggests that RTS is a form of the
more general post-traumatic stress disorder, whose precipitating
cause may be any kind of traumatic stress, not just sexual
violence. 9 If RTS justifies her proposal, but RTS is simply a form
of PTSD, then the proposal should be extended to any statement
about the possible cause of PTSD by one who could be suffering
PTSD.90
Such an extension would greatly change our litigation. It
should mean that the hearsay about the incident for anyone who
suffered violence, or perhaps the threat of violence, should be
admissible. This would cover robbery and assault victims and tort
and products liability claimants. Indeed, when an accused has been
hurt in the incident, his hearsay, too, should become admissible.9
Furthermore, post-traumatic stress disorder can result from
trauma not leading to physical injury. Events causing psychic
dread alone can trigger the condition.92 A soldier in combat who is
87. See Mosteller, supra note 82, at 498. "I would be distressed if these problematic
aspects of BWS evidence were extended indiscriminately to other areas . Id. He
concludes,
I now return to a key consideration - the consequences of an acknowledgment
that politics have played a role in shaping evidence law regarding the admission
of BWS evidence. I suggest that such recognition is likely to yield one specific
benefit: it will inhibit the expansion of the principles developed in battered
woman self-defense cases to more problematic situations.
Id. 509-10.
88. Since the proposal covers every statement made by a rape claimant whether that
person is then manifesting RTS or not, it seems impossible for RTS to justify the proposal.
89. "Rape Trauma Syndrome is based on Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome gen-
erally .... " Orenstein, supra note 1, at 218. "In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association
incorporated post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) into the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder. While not mentioned by name in either DSM-III or DSM-III-R,
rape trauma syndrome has been explicitly recognized as a classic form of PTSD." Stefan,
supra note 69, at 1295.
90. Of course, just as there is no requirement that the declarant be suffering RTS for the
hearsay to be admitted under Orenstein's proposal, there should be no need for other
declarants to be demonstrably suffering PTSD as long as their assertions were about the
source of what could be their PTSD.
91. See, e.g., People v. Sostre, 418 N.Y.S.2d 662, 70 A.D.2d 40 (App. Div. 1979) (holding
that the statement of defendant that he was shot "for nothing" not an excited utterance even
though defendant was shot twice and made the statement two to five minutes after being
shot).
92. See Stefan, supra note 69, at 1296.
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not physically injured can manifest the syndrome, and so presum-
ably can the victim of an attempted sexual assault.9" Victims can
find burglary stressful too, as, I suspect, can those who find their
checking accounts looted. Indeed, being the claimed victim of any
crime could perhaps qualify the hearsay. Thus, Orenstein's
principles, if taken seriously, might lead to the admission of any
complaining witness's out-of-court statements.
They could lead to even more. Surely, whether guilty or not,
one accused of a crime can suffer psychic harm. The person who is
arrested for rape, held in jail, told that he faces a twenty-five year
sentence, advised not to discuss his situation with others because
they cannot be trusted, and informed that juries frequently do not
believe mothers and siblings who furnish alibis, often experiences
sleepless nights, becomes withdrawn, grows wary of relationships,
is anxious, has fantastical thoughts, and experiences flashbacks.
If Orenstein's position leads to the conclusion that hearsay should
be admitted because of the possibility of suffering PTSD, then
perhaps all of the accused's hearsay becomes admissible. Defense
attorneys will now advise their clients to tell everyone in the
cellblock of their innocence, and upon release, to find a minister,
priest, or rabbi to tell it to, also.94
Perhaps Orenstein's justification can be made to rest specifi-
cally on RTS and not PTSD generally.95 This might be done if RTS
specifically indicates that delayed rape reports are reliable.96 RTS
can indicate this only if, first, delayed reporting is part of RTS, and,
second, researchers can assess the comparative validity of rape
93. In Orenstein's proposal, statements would be admissible from the "survivor" of an
attempted sexual assault or the "survivor" of a conspiracy to commit sexual assault. Such
people might be candidates for RTS or PTSD, but if the intended victim of a conspiracy was
not aware of the conspiracy until after arrests and the end of the conspiracy, what is the
justification for admitting the hearsay?
94. The conclusion that the accused's hearsay should be admissible does not require
concluding that the trauma's severity is the same for the sexual assault victim as it is for the
person accused of a crime. Orenstein's proposal does not depend on the severity of the
symptoms manifested by the victim. The accused also does not have to actually manifest
PTSD; the rape victim's hearsay is admissible without proof of such manifestation. Instead,
only the possibility that those accused of crime could manifest PTSD should be required, and
certainly a "social science lite" approach could find support for that proposition. See
Giamanco v. Epe, Inc., 619 So. 2d 842 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (affirmimg the damage award for
a person who suffered PTSD because of a bad permanent wave).
95. Of course, if the justification is limited to avoid certain consequences, it should be
clear that principles are not driving the proposal, but that justifications are being formulated
to reach desired results.
96. If there is no special reliability for the delayed rape report, the rape victim's hearsay
is not distinguished from the hearsay of other testifying witnesses. If this is so but only the
rape victim's hearsay is admitted, then it seems clear that the proposal is a political decision
to change the balance in rape cases, not a result justified by principles.
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complaints. These propositions, however, should not be asserted
lightly because they can also be turned around to challenge rape
claimants.
If delayed reporting is part of RTS, and RTS is the usual result
of being raped, then the person who reports rape immediately is not
acting like a person who is a typical rape victim.97 A person who
acts inconsistently with how a rape victim usually acts is less likely
to have been raped than the person who manifests the symptoms
ordinarily exhibited by a rape victim. If delayed reporting really is
a part of RTS, the defendant ought to be able to inform the jury that
the prompt reporter is less likely to be a rape victim than a person
who delayed reporting.
If RTS indicates that delayed reports are more reliable than
prompt ones, then, of course, the defendant should be able to
introduce that information when a report was immediate. Even if
the claim is not that delayed reports are more trustworthy than
prompt ones, but only that delayed reports are reliable, then the
claim still carries the assertion that RTS can describe circum-
stances correlating with unreliable reports. Any time the rape
claimant's circumstances place her in that not-reliable camp as
indicated by RTS, the defendant should be able to introduce the
evidence showing that the complaint is not trustworthy.
Whenever it becomes accepted that we can tell how rape
victims typically behave or can tell the reliability of rape com-
plaints, the door is open for a defendant to challenge the credibility
of rape claimants who do not fit these patterns.9 8 If we truly can
97. Orenstein suggests that the immediate report of rape, the excited utterance, conflicts
with how women react to rape. For example, she states, "However RTS informs evidence
law, we must question why a reaction to stress that is at odds with women's documented
experience is nevertheless venerated by evidence law." Orenstein, supra note 1, at 203. She
also asserts, "[Tihe proposed survivor's exception actually reflects what we know about how
people react to the trauma of sexual attack." Id. at 220. See also id. at 205, n.169
(suggesting that it is common for truth to develop over time when women recount a
traumatic story). Orenstein does little to probe these assertions even when she presents
material for their exploration.
Thus, Orenstein refers to United States v. Haner, No. ACM-31786, 1996 WL 520968
(C.A.A.F. Sept. 8, 1996). See Orenstein, note 1 at 221 n.216. She does not, however, discuss
how this case should be interpreted in light of her apparent arguments that delayed reports
are the reliable ones. The victim made statements that her husband had terrorized and
tortured her which were admitted as excited utterances. She was diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder. Later, however, she recanted those statements and said, as she
did at trial, that what had happened was part of consensual sado-masochistic sex. The
delayed version was admitted into evidence as, of course, was her testimony. The later
accounts, however, were not believed, and the defendant was convicted. Was the court's
refusal to credit the delayed report part of the court's continuing degradation of women?
98. See Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the
Probative Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 43,
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determine typical reactions and the reliability of reports, this
challenging evidence should be admitted because it increases trial
accuracy. But that is why feminists should be careful about
claiming what RTS and other rape research shows.99 Justifying
political goals by relying on RTS can harm rape victims if the
research truly does not support the claims. Such cases as Henson
v. State present the cautionary tale.100
Indiana had held that an expert on rape trauma syndrome
could testify that a victim's behavior was consistent with a person
who had suffered a traumatic rape, and thus, that a rape had
occurred.' 1 Once that decision was reached, it was inevitable that
defendants would seek to turn this around by showing that the rape
claimant's behavior was not consistent with traumatic rape, and
therefore, a rape had not occurred. Henson held that it was an
error to deny the defendant such evidence. "It would be fundamen-
tally unfair to allow the use of such testimony by the State... and
then deny its use by a defendant here."' 0 2 Of course, where this
offensive use of RTS is allowed, it is also inevitable that defendants
71 (1996). "[1hf statistics demonstrate the relevance of rape trauma syndrome for proving
that abuse occurred, those same statistics demonstrate the relevance of a failure to exhibit
rape truama syndrome for proving that abuse did not occur." Id.
99. Cf. Maguigan, supra note 19, at 87. Observers who believe that cultural information
is being received too readily by courts with the effect of condoning anti-woman violence often
focus on cases involving male defendants accused of crimes against family members. Their
call for the exclusion of cultural information ignores the impact such a rule would have on
the cases of women accused of crime.
100. 535 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1989).
101. Simmons v. State, 504 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 1987).
102. 535 N.E.2d at 1193.
The research literature does not claim that rape trauma syndrome is a
universal reaction to being raped, but that conclusion is an inevitable
consequence of trying to use rape trauma syndrome evidence in court .... This
leads to an argument that the fact that a complainant does not suffer from rape
trauma syndrome has evidentiary significance.
Stefan, supra note 69, at 1328. See also Myrna S. Raeder, The Double Edged Sword:
Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome by and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating
Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 813-15 (1996) (stating that if a prosecutor can
use an expert regarding battered women's syndrome, and the evidence is relevant, the defen-
dant can use comparable evidence). Compare Mary A. Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman,
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among Battered Women: Analysis of Legal Implications, 12
BEHAV. ScI. & L. 215, 224 (1994).
[A] serious risk of utilizing the presence of PTSD as an indicator that domestic
violence occurred is the unintended effect of establishing it as a threshold
criterion .... [A]lthough the presence of PTSD may be construed as support for
an allegation of prior domestic violence, the absence of PTSD does not likewise
indicate that such violence has not occurred.
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will seek to have their psychiatrists examine the rape claimants. 103
Court-ordered psychiatric examinations are an understandable
anathema to feminism, but they can flow from the principles
espoused by feminists. Feminists ought to be especially careful in
claiming a principled justification when the real goal is the political
one of shifting power in rape cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
Orenstein's proposal to expand excited utterances to admit all
the prior statements of rape claimants is not supported by her
hearsay analysis, and the feminist principles she presents do not
drive the proposal either. It should be acknowledge that politics is
the force behind the proposed change - changing the balance in
rape trials. Pretending the proposed change is based on principles
that do not support it can bring unforeseen, widespread changes,
some of which could be harmful to rape victims.
Instead of discussing sham rationales, we should have the real
debate. Should the balance be changed in rape cases, and if so, is
this the way to do it?
103. See, e.g., State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984) (trial court ordered
the victim to be examined by a defense psychiatrist). See also People v. Wheeler, 151 Ml1. 2d
298, 602 N.E.2d 826 (1992) (holding that when state uses expert who examined the victim
to testify that victim suffered from rape trauma syndrome to prove that a rape occurred,
defendant's expert can examine the victim). See also Stefan, supra note 69, at 1325.
Not only can a rape complainant be cross-examined about past traumatic sexual
experiences, but if the prosecution is claiming that she now has a disorder as
a result of defendant's rape, pre-existing disorders also become relevant to
rebut the inference created by expert's testimony .... In addition, she may be
forced to undergo compulsory psychiatric examination by the defendant's
mental health expert, which may be a particularly intrusive, unpleasant, and
violating experience.
